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EXHAUSTION OF TRIBAL COURT REMEDIES:
REJECTING BRIGHT-LINE RULES
AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

PHILLIP WM. LEAR* AND BLAKE D. MILLER**

[T]hat dramatically different facts ... should produce different
results is subject to the observation that it does not identify a
bright-line rule. The primary responsibility for line-drawing,
however, is vested in the legislature.
Justice John P. Stevens***

I.

INTRODUCTION

The doctrine of exhaustion of tribal court remedies is the latest
example of the ongoing tension between tribal and federal. courts.
Pursuant to this doctrine, a federal court will not hear a matter arising on
a reservation until the tribal court has determined the scope of its own
jurisdiction and entered a final ruling.' The doctrine assumes that no
federal statutes expressly direct exclusive federal jurisdiction, 2 or provide
for state court jurisdiction.3 The doctrine assumes concurrent jurisdic* H.B A. 1969, J.D. 1975, University of Utah. Mr. Lear is a partner in the Salt Lake City office
of Snell & Wilmer. He practices natural resources law with an emphasis on mineral exploration and
production activities and represents mineral developers on Indian country. He is admitted to practice
in Utah, Colorado, and Wyoming and before the Ute Tribal Court of the Uintah and Ouray
Reservation. His applications for admission are pending before the Navajo Nation and the State of
Montana. Messrs. Lear and Miller represented Boyd & McWilliams Energy Group, Inc. in the federal
district court and Navajo tribal court cases which provided the genesis for this article and symposium.
See infra notes 110 & 123.
** B.A. 1980, Boise State University; J.D. 1983, University of Utah. Mr. Miller is a partner with
the Salt Lake City firm of Suitter Axland & Hanson where he practices complex commercial litigation.
He is admitted to practice in the State of Utah.
*** Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408,447
(1989).
1. See Duncan Energy Co., Inc. v. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, 27
F.3d 1249, 1300 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 779 (1995) (relying on Crawford v. Genuine
Parts Co., 947 F.2d 1405, 1407 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1174 (1992) for the proposition
that exhaustion of tribal court remedies is mandatory).
2. See, e.g., Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
3. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (as amended and codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1162
(1988)) which authorized some states and directed others to assume civil and criminal jurisdiction over
Indian country. See generally William V. Vetter, The Four Decisions in Three Affiliated Tribes and
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tion of sovereigns. Concurrent jurisdiction is the natural product of
unique overlapping of governmental authority that characterizes much
of Indian law jurisprudence. 4
Advocates for mandatory exhaustion extol the rule because of its
simplicity, easy application, and judicial economy. 5 They argue that
National Farmers Union Insurance Companies v. Crow Indian Tribe6
and Iowa Mutual Insurance Company v. LaPlante,7 the seminal cases
announcing the exhaustion doctrine, created a bright-line test with no
exceptions.8 In their view, a case first must be addressed by tribal courts
to serve the underlying federal Indian law polices of sovereignty and
self-determination. Only in this manner, they argue, will tribal courts
develop the experience necessary to bring true self-governance to Native
American people.9
As worthy as sovereignty and self-determination policies may be,
National Farmers and Iowa Mutual do not mandate exhaustion of tribal
court remedies. Bright-line tests result from tortured reading of the
seminal cases by federal district and appellate courts. In point of fact,
the exhaustion doctrine being developed by the federal courts is
protectionist. Ironically, protectionist attitudes favoring mandatory
exhaustion of tribal court remedies diminish rather than enhance tribal
court sovereignty and debase any notion of equal dignity of courts.
At issue is the clash of federal policies. On the one hand, the
federal courts are obliged to take jurisdiction over cases raising federal
questions.10 On the other, federal Indian policy continues to embrace

Pre-Emption by Policy, 23 LAND & WATER L. REV. 43 (1988); Robert Laurence, Service of Process
and Execution of Judgment on Indian Reservations, 10 AM. INDIAN. L. REV. 257 (1982).
4. See Cotton Petroleum Co. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
5. See, e.g., Laurie Reynolds, Exhaustionof Tribal Remedies: Extolling Tribal Sovereignty While
Expanding Federal Jurisdiction, 73 N.C. L. REv. 1089 (1995) (applauding mandatory exhaustion
involving challenges to tribal court jurisdiction, but rejecting the doctrine in cases challenging the
tribes' administrative or legislative jurisdiction); Alex T. Skibine, Deference Owed Tribal Courts'
JurisdictionalDeterminations: Towards Co-Existence, Understanding,and Respect Between Different
Culturaland JudicialNorms, 24 N.M. L. REV. 191 (1994); Timothy W. Joranko, Exhaustion of Tribal
CourtRemedies in Lower CourtsAfter National FarmersUnion and Iowa Mutual: Toward a Consistent
Treatment of Tribal Courts by the FederalJudicial System, 78 MINN. L. REv. 259, 209, 293 (1993);
Frank Pommersheim, The Crucible of Sovereignty: Analyzing Issues of TribalJurisdiction, 31 ARIZ. L.
REV. 329 (1989); Frank Pommersheim, Liberation, Dreams, and HardWork: An Essay on Tribal Court
Jurisdiction, 10 U. PUGET SouND L. REV. 231 (1987).
6. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
7. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
8. See, e.g., Joranko, supra note 5, 266, 290-91.
9. P.S. Deloria, opening comments introducing the litigation panel at this symposium. See 71 N.D.
L. REV. 273 (1995) [hereinafter Symposium].
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. 1993).
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the laudable goals of tribal self-determination and sovereignty.11
Requiring the federal judiciary to decline to exercise its jurisdiction in all
cases when a tribal court has a colorable basis for jurisdiction is nothing
less than affirmative action for tribal courts.
Authorities acknowledge the shifting winds of federal Indian policy.
During the first hundred years, Congress "treated" with Indian tribes as
sovereign nations. 12 Indeed, the Constitution rather clearly placed tribes
outside the federal system.1 3 During the second hundred- years,
Congress has regulated tribes through legislation, initially with design of
assimilating individual Indians into mainstream American society and
terminating tribal existencel 4 and then reorganizing them into constitutional entities replete with western governmental institutions and notions
of Anglo-American jurisprudence.' 5 One might argue that with its
legislation, Congress has effectively brought Indian tribes within the
federal system.16
Despite changing policies regarding the relationship of Indian tribes
to the federal government, the premise of separate sovereign nations has
never been abandoned. 17 Tribes retain inherent powers and authorities
derived from primeval sovereignty, not otherwise withdrawn by treaty or
11. Contemporary policy is memorialized in the Congressional Statement of Findings to the Indian
Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act of 1975, as follows:
Congress, after careful review of the Federal government's historical and special legal
relationship with ... American Indian people finds that:
(1) the prolonged Federal domination of Indian service programs has served to
retard rather than enhance the progress of Indian people and their communities by
depriving Indians of the full opportunity to develop leadership skills crucial to the
realization of self-government, and has denied to the Indian people an effective voice in
the planning and implementation of programs for the benefit of Indians which are
responsive to the true needs of Indian communities ....
25 U.S.C. § 450(a)( 1988).
12. The "treaty era" endured from 1789 to 1871. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OFFEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 68-78 (1945). Congress "treated" with Indian tribes as sovereign nations pursuant to its
treaty power. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. The Supreme Court characterized constitutional authority
as one empowering Congress to make treaties with Indians as with foreign nations. See United States
v. Forty-three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 197 (1876).
13. See Joranko, supra note 5, at 262.
14. See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 436 (citations omitted). See generally, CoHEN, supra note 12, ch.
11, at 207-208 (chronicling the history of the "Allotment Era" and citing statutes, congressional
records, and reports of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs). The Allotment Era ended with
enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, which expressly prohibited allotments. See 25
U.S.C. § 461 (1988).
15. See generally, COHEN, supra note 12, ch. 11 (chronicling the history of the "Allotment Era")
& ch. 7 (discussing the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 984).
16. See Joranko, supra note 5, at 262-63. See also, Frank B. Higgins, International Law
Considerations of the American Indian Nations by the United States, 3 ARiz. L. REV. 74, 84 (1961)
(stating that the United States initially treated with Indian tribes as international sovereigns, but later
amended the relationship to one of national sovereigns without the knowledge and consent of the
Indian nations).
17. See William A. Vetter, Of Tribal Courts and "Territories" Is Full Faithand CreditRequired?,
23 CAL. WEST. L. REV. 219,220 (1987). Cf., Higgins, supra note 16, at 84.
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statutes.18 They are not states, as they are not parties to the Constitution.19 They are "higher" than states. 2 0 They occupy a unique
position, perhaps more akin to nation states. 2 1 If nation states, then with
respect to areas of sovereignty not limited or regulated by Congress, they
are truly independent sovereigns. If they are independent sovereigns,
they should be treated within the framework of international law.
Against the backdrop of historical antecedents, one can stage a
broad, workable analysis that relieves tribal, state, and federal court
tensions at least in the context of concurrent jurisdiction. If one is to
view Indian tribes as dependent sovereigns within the federal system,
technically they should be treated analogous to territories or possessions,
subject to comity among states, full faith and credit, and abstention. 22 If
we consider Indian tribes to be sovereign nations, international choice of
law rules embodied in the judicial policy of comity should govern
concurrent jurisdiction cases. Tribal and federal tensions thus could be
eased within the international context of comity among foreign nations.
Indeed, commentators have argued that tribal courts might best be
handled in the context of national comity, generally, 23 if not international law, specifically. 24 What is lacking in the legal literature is an
exposition to assist litigants and courts in resolving the conundrum.
Truly, if we desire to give full weight to self-determination, let us do so
within the full spectrum of social, economic, and legal intercourse
among sovereigns in a global society. Hence, this appeal to international
law principles of comity and this article's decided counterpoint to
bright-line rules and no-exception philosophies.
II.

HISTORY OF THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE

The history of the relationship between the federal government and
Indian tribes has been the subject of numerous scholarly works and will
not be repeated here. 25 Suffice to say, that although Indian tribes are
considered sovereign entities, they are subject to the plenary power of
Congress. The sovereignty of Indian tribes, therefore, "exists only at the

18. Worcester v. Georgia, 6 U.S. (Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
19. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978).
20. See Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134 (10th Cir. 1959).
21. See Hubbard v. Chinle Sch. Dist. Nos. 4/5, 3 Nay. R. 167, 169 (1988).
22. Symposium, supra note 9,71 N.D.L. REv. 365 (1995)(comments of Robert N. Clinton on trust
panel).
23. See, eg., Vetter, supra note 17, at 269; Laurence, supra note 3, at 277.
24. See Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courtsandthe Federal Union, 26, WiLLAmErTE L. REv. 841,
904-08 (1990) (discussing federal, state, and tribal court decisions); Higgins, supra note 16.
25. See id.; Joranko, supra note 5; Clinton, supra note 24; Nell J. Newton, FederalPower over
Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REv.195 (1984).
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sufferance of Congress," 26 which has the power to modify or limit a
tribes' authority. According to the United States Supreme Court, "all
aspects of Indian sovereignty are subject to defeasance by Congress."27
Although Congress has the power to limit the sovereign powers of an
Indian tribe, however, Congress is not the source of tribal authority. As
stated by Felix Cohen:
Perhaps the most basic principle of all Indian law, .

.

. is

the principle that those powers which are lawfully vested in an
Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated powers granted by
express acts of Congress, but rather inherent powers of a
limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished. Each
Indian tribe begins its relationship with the Federal Government as a sovereign power, recognized as such in treaty and
legislation. The powers of sovereignty have been limited from
time to time by special treaties and laws designed to take from
the Indian tribes control of matters which, in the judgment of
Congress, these tribes could no longer be safely permitted to
handle. The statutes of Congress, then, must be examined to
determine the limitations of tribal sovereignty rather than to
determine its sources or its positive content. What is not
expressly limited remains within the domain of tribal
sovereignty .28

It follows that regardless of the characterization of Indian tribes vis-A-vis
the federal government, whether as independent or dependent sovereigns, they have retained their right of self-rule.

26. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1977).
27. Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Bands of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 788 n.30
(1984).
28. COHEN, supra note 12, at 122. In Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall opined:
[T]he settled doctrine of nations is, that a weaker power does not surrender its
independence-its right to self-government- by associating with a stronger, and taking it
under its protection. A weak state, in order to provide for its safety, may place itself
under the protection of one more powerful, without stripping itself of the right of
government, and ceasing to be a state. Examples of this kind are not wanting in Europe.
"Tributary and feudatory states," say Vattel, "do not therby [sic] cease to be sovereign
and independent states, so long as self-government, and sovereign and independent
authority, are left in the administration of the state."
6 U.S. (Pet.) at 560.
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE: NATIONAL

FARMERS UNION

In National Farmers Union Insurance Companies v. Crow Tribe of
Indians,29 the Supreme Court faced a challenge to the jurisdiction of a
tribal court. Prior to the commencement of the federal action, a Crow
Indian filed suit in tribal court against a school district for personal
injuries arising from an accident at a school within the reservation, but
on land owned by the state of Montana. 3 0 After the failure of the school
district to respond, the plaintiff took a default judgment in the tribal
court. 3 1 Thereafter, the school district and its insurer filed suit in federal
court, challenging the jurisdiction of the tribal court and requesting an
injunction against further proceedings in tribal court.3 2 The school
district and its insurer relied on 28 U.S.C. section 1331 for federal
jurisdiction .33
The first issue addressed by the Supreme Court in National Farmers
was whether the case presented a federal question within the meaning of
section 1331.34 The school district argued that, since federal law defines
the limitations of a tribe's sovereignty, the jurisdiction of the tribal court
was a matter of federal law. 35 Although recognizing that the scope of a
tribal court's jurisdiction is based neither on a federal statute nor the
Constitution, the Supreme Court agreed. 3 6 Thus, "[t]he question
whether an Indian tribe retains the power to compel a non-Indian
property owner to submit to the civil jurisdiction of a tribal court is one
that must be answered by reference to federal law and is a 'federal
question' under section 1331."37
After finding the existence of a federal question, the Court then
addressed whether the school district was first required to exhaust its
remedies in tribal court. 38 This issue depended, in part, on whether tribal
29. 471 U.S. 845 (1985). Articles rejecting mandatory exhaustion of tribal court remedies
include: Lynn H. Slade, Dispute Resolution in Indian Country: Harmonizing National Farmers Union,
Iowa Mutual, and the Abstention Doctrine in the FederalCourts, 71 N.D. L. REV. 519 (1995); Joranko,
supra note 5. G. Sonny Cave, Litigation with Indians in MINERAL DEVELOPMENT ON INDLAN LANDS 6-1
(1989).
30. National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
31. Id. at 847.
32. Id.
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1993) (providing that federal district courts "shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States").
34. 471 U.S. at 850.
35. Id. at 852.
36. Id. at 850.
37. Id. at 852.
38. Dissenting in part, yet concurring in the result, Justice Wright of the Ninth Circuit had stated
that petitioners were required to exhaust their Tribal Court remedies prior to seeking relief from the
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courts were precluded from exercising jurisdiction over non-Indians in
civil matters. Six years earlier, in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,3 9
the Supreme Court held that Indian tribes do not possess criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians, even as to offenses committed on the
reservation.4 0 This time, however, the Court rejected application of
Oliphant in civil disputes. Instead,
the existence and extent of a tribal court's [civil]
jurisdiction will require a careful examination of tribal
sovereignty, the extent to which that sovereignty has been
altered, divested, or diminished, as well as a detailed study of
relevant statutes, Executive Branch policy as embodied in
treaties and elsewhere, and administrative or judicial deci1
sions. 4
Further, the Supreme Court held that the analysis of the existence
and extent of a tribal court's civil jurisdiction should be conducted first
in tribal court. 4 2 The Court explained the underlying policy as follows:
That policy favors a rule that will provide the forum whose
jurisdiction is being challenged the first opportunity to evaluate
the factual and legal bases for the challenge. Moreover the
orderly administration of justice in the federal court will be
served by allowing a full record to be developed in the Tribal
Court before either the merits or any question concerning
appropriate relief is addressed. The risks of the kind of
"procedural nightmare" that has allegedly developed in this
case will be minimized if the federal court stays its hand until
after the Tribal Court has had a full opportunity to determine
its own jurisdiction and to rectify any errors it may have made.
Exhaustion of tribal court remedies, moreover, will encourage
tribal courts to explain to the parties the precise basis for
federal court. 736 F.2d 1320, 1326 (9th Cit. 1984).
39. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
40. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978). In Oliphant, the Supreme
Court stated that:
By submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the United States, Indian tribes
therefore necessarily give up their power to try non-Indian citizens of the United States
except in a manner acceptable to Congress. This principal would have been obvious a
century ago when most Indian tribes were characterized by a "want of fixed laws [and]
of competent tribunals of justice."
Id.
41. National Farmers,471 U.S. at 855-56.
42. Id. at 856. Exhaustion is not required, however, "where an assertion of tribal jurisdiction 'is
motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith,' or where the action is patently violative
of express jurisdictional prohibitions, or where exhaustion would be futile because of the lack of an
adequate opportunity to challenge the court's jurisdiction." Id. at 856 n.21.
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accepting jurisdiction, and will also provide other courts with
the benefit of their expertise in such matters in the event of
43
further judicial review.
The holding of National Farmers,therefore, is two-fold: (1) the issue of
the scope of a tribal court's jurisdiction is a federal question; and (2)
actions first brought in tribal court are not subject to jurisdictional
challenges in federal court prior to exhaustion of tribal court remedies.
B. IOWA MuTuAL
Two years later, the Supreme Court considered a challenge to a
tribal court's jurisdiction in federal court under the diversity statute. In
Iowa Mutual Insurance Company v. LaPlante,4 4 two Blackfeet Indians
filed suit in tribal court for damages arising from an motor vehicle
accident on the Blackfeet reservation. 45 The complaint sought not only
damages for personal injuries, but damages against the insurance
companies for bad faith refusal to settle. 4 6 The insurance companies
47
filed a motion in tribal court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
Finding it had subject matter jurisdiction, the tribal court denied the
motion .48

Rather than proceeding further in tribal court, the insurers filed a
federal court action seeking a declaratory judgment that they had no
duty to defend or indemnify under the policy. 49 The district court
dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.0 The
district court reasoned that federal courts, sitting in diversity, act merely
as "adjuncts" to state courts. 5 1 Since, absent tribal consent, state courts
do not have jurisdiction over reservation disputes,5 2 federal courts also
lack subject matter jurisdiction in diversity cases. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed.

43. Id. at 856-67 (footnotes omitted).
44. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
45. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 12. The tribal court also ruled that the plaintiffs failed to plead sufficient facts from
which jurisdiction could be determined. Id. The Court dismissed the complaint, without prejudice, and
allowed the plaintiffs leave to amend. Id.
49. Id.at 13. The insurers also filed a federal action seeking a declaratory judgment that the
tribal court lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiffs bad faith claims. This action was dismissed, without
prejudice, following the Supreme Court's decision in National Farmers.
50. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 13.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
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The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court held that federal courts
do have subject matter jurisdiction in diversity cases arising within the
reservation. The Court held, however, that the exhaustion rule established in National Farmers applied equally to diversity cases. The issue
of the scope of a tribal court's jurisdiction, therefore, must first be
considered by the tribal court.5 3
In holding that the National Farmers' exhaustion rule applied
equally to diversity cases, the Court cited the policy of encouraging
tribal self-government:
Regardless of the basis for jurisdiction, the federal policy
supporting tribal self-government directs a federal court to stay
its hand in order to give the tribal court a "full opportunity to
determine its own jurisdiction." In diversity cases, as well as
federal-question cases, unconditional access to the federal
forum would place it in direct competition with the tribal
courts, thereby impairing the latter's authority over reservation
affairs. Adjudication of such matters by any nontribal court
also infringes upon tribal lawmaking authority, because tribal
courts are best qualified to interpret and apply tribal law.54
In addition, only the tribal court's determination of its jurisdiction is
subject to federal review. Unless tribal court jurisdiction is later
determined to be improper, the merits of the case will not be reconsidered by a federal forum.5 5
Justice Stevens, in a separate opinion, agreed that federal courts have
subject matter jurisdiction, but dissented from the application of the
exhaustion rule.56 Although agreeing that "only in the most extraordinary circumstances" should a federal court enjoin litigation pending in
another tribunal, 57 Justice Stevens was concerned that federal courts not
abdicate their responsibilities to decide the merits of controversy
properly before it:
For purposes of our decision, it is therefore appropriate to
assume that the Tribal Court and the Federal District Court had
concurrent jurisdiction over the dispute.
The question
presented is whether the Tribal Court's jurisdiction is a
sufficient reason for requiring the federal court to decline to
53. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 11. The Court defined the issue before it as "whether a federal court
may exercise diversity jurisdiction before the tribal court system has an opportunity to determine its
own jurisdiction." Id.
54. Id. at 16 (citations omitted).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 20.
57. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S.at 21.
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exercise its own jurisdiction until the Tribal Court has decided
the case on the merits. In my opinion it is not.5 8
The factual underpinnings of National Farmers and Iowa Mutual
are significant. Both federal actions were brought by non-Indians
attempting to avoid pending tribal court proceedings. Neither action
involved the interpretation or analysis of federal statutory or common
law. In addition, neither decision involved the applicability of the
exhaustion rule when resolution of the dispute requires a determination
of federal law.
After Iowa Mutual, the Supreme Court decided South Dakota v.
Bourland59 and Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation,60 both federal substantive law cases, and did not
require exhaustion in either case. In light of Bourland and Brendale, the
conclusion to be drawn is that National Farmers and Iowa Mutual stand
for the narrow proposition that exhaustion in federal questions cases is
mandatory if and when the only federal question is the scope of tribal,
court jurisdiction to hear the case.
C.

POST-IOWA APPLICATION OF THE EXHAUSTION RULE BY LOWER

COURTS

The application of the exhaustion rule by lower courts has been
inconsistent at best. At one end of the spectrum are those cases which
hold that exhaustion is a mandatory requirement, limited only by the
three exceptions set forth in National Farmers. On the other end of the
spectrum are those cases which limit exhaustion to jurisdictional issues
involving cases arising on a reservation and/or involving tribal law. Such
inconsistent approaches are best illustrated by the four circuits most
often dealing with exhaustion cases-the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits.
1. Seventh Circuit
In Altheimer & Gray v. Sioux Manufacturing Corp.,6 1 a. medical
supply fabricating company brought an action in Illinois state court
against a tribal corporation for breach of contract for failing to establish
a medical supply manufacturing operation on the Devil's Lake Sioux

58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 20.
113 S. Ct. 2309 (1993).
492 U.S. 408 (1989).
983 F.2d 803 (7th Cir. 1993).
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Reservation in Fort Totten, North Dakota. 6 2 The parties had entered into
a letter of intent in which the tribal corporation waived its sovereign
63
immunity and designated the law of Illinois as governing the contract.
Neither party obtained the consent of the Secretary of the Interior.
When the deal failed to consummate, the medical supply company sued
the tribal corporation in state court, and its law firm sued the tribal
corporation in federal court to recover its fees for negotiating the
agreement.64 The tribal corporation removed the state action to federal
court where the court consolidated the cases. The federal district court
refused to require exhaustion of tribal remedies because the principal
issue in the case involved a federal question, namely the nature of the
Secretarial requirement to consent to all contracts, and because the court
refused "to place before the tribal court a dispute that must be resolved
by the laws of a distant jurisdiction." 6 5 The court refused to read
National Farmers and Iowa Mutual to require exhaustion of tribal court
remedies as a judicial condition precedent to federal courts taking cases
arising on Indian reservations. Rather, it favored a broader reading
66
requiring "an examination of the factual circumstances of each case."
The court distinguished National Farmers and Iowa Mutual because (1)
there was no challenge to tribal court jurisdiction, (2) no pending case in
tribal court, and (3) the dispute did touch or concern a tribal ordinance
or law.

67

2. Eighth Circuit
The positions taken by the Eighth Circuit are perhaps best
illustrated by Northern States Power Co. v. PrairieIsland Mdewakanton
Sioux Indian Community6 8 and Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated
Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation.69 In Northern States, an electric
utility operating a nuclear power plant brought a federal court action
seeking a declaratory judgment that a tribal ordinance regarding the
transportation of nuclear materials was preempted by the Hazardous

62. Altheimer & Gray v. Sioux Mfg. Corp., 938 F.2d 803 (7th Cir. 1993).
63. Id. at 806.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 814.
66. Id. One commentator has christened the Seventh Circuit's fact-based approach to exhaustion
as the "particularized inquiry" test. See Joranko, supra note 5, at 290.
67. Altheimer, 983 F.2d 803,814.
68. 991 F.2d 458 (8th Ci. 1993).
69. 27 F.3d 1294 (1994), cert. denied, 130 L. Ed.2d 673 (1995). The authors represented the
Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Association as amicus curiae in support of Duncan Energy Company's
petition for certiorari.
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Materials Transportation Act (HMTA).70 The tribal ordinance required
that transporters of nuclear material obtain a separate tribal license for
each shipment. 7 1 The ordinance also specified that each permit be filed
180 days in advance of each shipment and be accompanied by an
application fee. 7 2 The HMTA provided that any state or tribal law is
preempted if such law creates an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the HMTA.73 The tribe argued that the plaintiff should
have first exhausted, tribal remedies. 74 The Eighth Circuit quickly
disposed of that issue. According to the Eighth Circuit, the HMTA
preempted the tribal ordinance, thereby leaving the plaintiff with nothing
to exhaust. 7 5
In Duncan Energy, however, the court required exhaustion. 7 6
Duncan Energy challenged the imposition of a tribal one-percent tax on
all real and personal property within the reservation and certain
employment requirements. 77 Duncan Energy operated numerous oil
and gas leases from non-Indian landowners on lands arguably within the
reservation. 78 It first argued that a certain Homestead Act diminished the
reservation, taking the subject lands out of the jurisdiction of the tribe.79
Second, Duncan Energy challenged the ability of the tribe to regulate
the activities of non-tribal members on non-Indian fee lands.80
The circuit court required exhaustion.8 1 According to the court, the
tribal court must first determine if the subject tax and employment
statutes comply with the requirements set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in Montana v. United States,82 In so holding, the court
assumed that federal courts would have the ability to review the findings
of the tribal court on these factual and legal issues: "[W]e note that the
tribe may have a heavy burden justifying these tax and employment
statutes under the Montana exceptions, but that caveat does not alter our
70. Northern States Power Co. v. Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux Indian Community, 991 F.2d
458 (8th Cir. 1993).
71. Id. at 461.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 462.
74. Id.
75. Northern States, 991 F.2d at 462. The court failed to explain why the plaintiff should not be
required to first address the preemption argument to the tribal court.
76. Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, 27 F.3d
1294, 1299 (8th Cit. 1994), cert. denied, 130 L. Ed.2d 673 (1995).
77. Id. at 1296.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1298.
81. Duncan Energy, 27 F.3d at 1299.
82. Id. at 27 F.3d at 1301 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981)). In Montana,
the Supreme court set forth certain factors to determine if a tribe's attempts to regulate the activities of
non-tribe members are a proper exercise of its sovereign powers.-
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conclusion that this issue is for the Tribal Court to determine in the first
instance." 8 3 This conclusion is dubious in light of the Supreme Court's
pronouncement in Iowa Mutual that federal courts will not rehear the
merits of the action considered by the tribal court.
3. Ninth Circuit
In diversity cases, the Ninth Circuit looks to the action's nexus with
the reservation. Its first post-Iowa exhaustion case, Wellman v. Chevron
U.S.A.,84 was a breach of contract case. The subject contract involved
construction work to be performed on the reservation. The Ninth Circuit
held that exhaustion was mandatory in all diversity actions arising from
activities on the reservation: "If the dispute arises in Indian territory,
[the parties] are limited to tribal court as the forum of first recourse. It is
in non-Indian matters only that non-Indians can go to district court
directly." 8 5
In Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 86 however, the Ninth Circuit
declined to require exhaustion. 8 7 There, an Indian village attempted to
impose a tax against a state school district. Addressing the exhaustion
issue as one of comity, the Ninth Circuit refused to require exhaustion
until the sovereign status of the village was determined. 88
In Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation,89 the Ninth Circuit upheld an exhaustion ruling in a diversity case.90
That case involved a breach of contract claim involving a sawmill located
on the reservation. Subsequently, in Stock West Corp. v. Taylor 9 l
however, the Ninth Circuit originally refused to require exhaustion in a
legal malpractice action involving the very same sawmill. 9 2 In that case,
the court considered it important that the subject legal opinion, drafted
by a non-Indian on the reservation, was delivered to a non-Indian off the
reservation. Finding that the case presented a non-reservation matter, the
court held that "in non-Indian matters, 'non-Indians can go to district
court directly."' 9 3 On rehearing, however, the decision was reversed. 94
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
1989).
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
815 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 578.
856 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1988).
Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 856 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 1388.
873 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1989).
Stock West, Inc. v Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir.
942 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 964 F.2d 912 (1992).
Stock West Corp. v. Taylor, 942 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 964 F.2d 912 (1992).
Id. at 663 (quoting Wellman, 815 F.2d at 579).
964 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1992).
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There, the en banc decision reconsidered the issue of whether the matter
involved a reservation affair and held that the malpractice may have
occurred on the reservation. The court thus required exhaustion. 9 5
In federal question cases in the Ninth Circuit, exhaustion is less
clear. In Burlington Northern Railroad v. Blackfeet Tribe,96 the Circuit
entertained a challenge to a tribe's attempted taxation of a railroad right
of way through the reservation. The court rejected the tribe's assertion
that exhaustion was required:
Burlington Northern's failure to exhaust is not a bar to
jurisdiction, and the district court did not abuse it discretion by
reaching the merits. The complaint presents issues of federal,
not tribal law; no proceeding is pending in any tribal court; the
tribal court possesses no special expertise; and exhaustion
would not have assisted the district court in deciding federal
law issues. 97
A scant four months later, however, the Ninth Circuit required
abstention in a challenge to a tribal ordinance regulating railroads
crossing the reservation. In Burlington Northern Railroad Company,9 8
the Ninth Circuit stated that exhaustion is a mandatory prerequisite to a
federal court's exercise of its concurrent jurisdiction.99
4. Tenth Circuit
Of all of the circuits, the Tenth Circuit most readily embraces a
mandatory exhaustion requirement. In Smith v. Moffett,lOO an Indian
commenced a civil rights action in the United States District Court
against federal officials, tribal officials, and private individuals.' 0 ' The
district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. 10 2 The Tenth
Circuit remanded the case to the district court for a determination of
whether the plaintiffs claims "arose on the reservation and whether they
95. Id.at 920.
96. 924 F. 2d 899 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3013 (1992).
97. Id. at 901 n.2 (citations omitted).
98. 940 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1991).
99. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Crow Tribal Council, 940 F.2d 1239, 1245 (9th Cir. 1991).
100. 947 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1991).
101. Jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (1993):
[T]o redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the
United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.
The opinion is silent as to why this provision was applicable to actions by the tribe or tribal officials,
acting under color of tribal law.
102. Smith, 947 F.2d at 443.
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have been presented to the appropriate tribal court." 10 3 In so holding,
the court posited that National Farmers and Iowa Mutual established an
"inflexible bar" to a federal court considering a case prior to exhaustion of tribal remedies. 10 4 This holding was based on the doubtful
conclusion that the Supreme Court did not find a congressional "intent
[to limit tribal court jurisdiction] in the federal question statute at issue in
National Farmers Union."105 National Farmers did not involve a
federal statute. Rather, the only federal question in National Farmers
was the scope of the tribal court's jurisdiction.
In Bank of Oklahoma v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation,106 the Tenth
Circuit required exhaustion even in cases arguably arising off the
reservation. 10 7 There, a bank filed an interpleader action in federal court
involving a tribe's bank account used in connection with the tribe's bingo
hall. In opposing exhaustion, the bank argued that the banking activity
took place off the reservation. The Tenth Circuit made short shrift of
this argument. According to the court, "this jurisdiction argument
should first be heard in tribal court." 108
In Texaco, Inc. v. Zah, 10 9 the court again required exhaustion. 11 0
There, Texaco challenged the Navajo Nation's imposition of a tax on
production and pipeline activities occurring outside the reservation but
within Navajo Indian Country. As opposed to Bank of Oklahoma,
however, the Tenth Circuit ruled that whether the issue arises on or off
the reservation is important in determining whether exhaustion should
apply:
When the activity at issue arises on the reservation, these
policies almost always dictate that the parties exhaust their
tribal remedies before resorting to the federal forum. Thus, we
have characterized the tribal exhaustion rule as "an inflexible
bar to consideration of the merits of the petition by the federal
court." When the dispute involves non-Indian activities
occurring outside the reservation, however, the policies behind
the tribal exhaustion rule are not so obviously served; Under
these circumstances, we must depend upon the district courts to
examine assiduously the National Farmers factors in determining whether comity requires the parties to exhaust their tribal
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 445.
Id.
Id.
972 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1992).
Bank of Oklahoma v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 972 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1170.
5 F.3d 1374 (10th Cir. 1993).
Texaco, Inc. v. Zah, 5 F.3d 1374 (10th Cir. 1993).
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remedies before presenting their dispute to the federal
courts. 1
III. JUXTAPOSITION OF THE MANDATORY EXHAUSTION RULE
WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW
The mandatory exhaustion rule is inconsistent with well recognized
international legal principles of concurrent jurisdiction. Such international legal principles provide the necessary guidance when courts of two
sovereigns have concurrent jurisdiction over a particular matter. As
opposed to mandatory exhaustion, these international legal principles
provide a better approach to resolving concurrent jurisdictional issues
between federal and tribal courts.
A substantial body of law has developed regarding the priority
principle of concurrent jurisdiction. According to this principle, the
court of concurrent jurisdiction that first exercises its jurisdiction should
be allowed to finalize the case. 11 2 Comity has often been given as the
justification for the priority principle.11 3 Similarly, courts employing the
mandatory exhaustion rule have justified their decisions, in part, on the
doctrine of comity.
Comity is a frequently used term in international relations.
Unfortunately, comity is also a broadly-used term, often encompassing
concepts such as courtesy, reciprocity, morality, and utility' 14
According to the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States,l 15 comity is:

neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of
mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the
111. Id. at 1378 (citation omitted).
112. See, e.g., Scott v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 293 P.2d 18 (1956). As between federal and
state courts, however, this principle is sometimes not applied to actions in personam. Donovan v.
Dallas, 375 U.S. 878 (1963).
113. E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Stay of Civil Proceedings Pending Determination of Action in
FederalCourt in Same State, 56 A.L.R. 2d 325,341 (1957).
114. The Constitution directs each state to give "full faith and credit" to public acts, records, and
judicial proceedings of other states. U.S CONST. art. IV, § 1. Congress extended the obligation and
entitlement to territories and possessions of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1984). Congress
has not extended the concept to federal courts. Despite the able arguments of some commentators
advancing the notion that tribal courts should by virtue of their dependent sovereign status be brought
under the panoply of section 1738, most state courts have rejected the application of full faith and
credit to Indian tribes, while others states embraced the result of giving full faith and credit either
expressly or impliedly under principles of comity. Id. At least one tribal court has rejected the
application of full faith and credit of state courts decisions to tribal courts for the traditional reason of
the clause's applicability solely to states of the union. See Anderson Petroleum Serv., Inc. v. Chuska
Energy & Petroleum Co., 4 Nav. R. 187 (1983); Hubbard v. Chinle Sch. Dist., 3 Nav. R. 167 (1982)
(urging application of international law principles to the independent sovereign Navajo Nation).
115. RESTATEMENT (THRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES (1986).
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recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having
due regard both to international duty and convenience and to
the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under
the protection of its laws.1 16
Rather than focus on comity, however, the Restatement uses the
principal of "reasonableness" as the appropriate limitation on
concurrent jurisdiction.17 The Restatement lists the following factors to
consider whether the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction is reasonable:
(a) the link of the activity to the state;
(b) the link between the parties and the state;
(c) the importance of the regulation to the state;
(d) the justified expectations of the parties;
(e) the extent to which regulation is consistent with the
traditions of the international system;
(f) the extent to which another state has an interest in
regulating the activity; and
(g) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another
state. 118
If, after applying the foregoing factors, it is not unreasonable for
more than one state to exercise jurisdiction over a person or activity and
the laws of the two states differ: "[E]ach state has an obligation to
evaluate its own as well as the other state's interest in exercising
jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant factors . . . . [A] state should
defer to the other state if that state's interest is clearly greater."119
Although typically applied to cases of concurrent jurisdiction in
international law, the foregoing factors are not dissimilar to those used in
resolving concurrent jurisdictional issues. For example, it is wellrecognized that federal courts may enjoin a party from commencing or
continuing a suit in another forum. 120 In so doing, courts often look to
whether the other proceeding was commenced prior to or subsequent to
the federal action,121 the motives of the parties in commencing the other

116. Id. § 101 (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113,163-64 (1895)).
117. Id. at part IV, Introductory Note.
118. Id. § 403(2).
119. Id. § 403(3).
120. This was what each of the plaintiffs sought in National Farmersand Iowa Mutual.
121. See, e.g., In re Salvore, 36 F.2d 712 (2d Cir. 1929). In Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Savena,
Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. 1984), the court refused to enjoin subsequent actions in
foreign countries.
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action, 122 and whether an injunction is necessary to protect the interests
123
of the federal forum.
The foregoing factors are also in accord with the well-established
principle of federal law that federal courts have an obligation to resolve
all matters properly brought before them. In Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. United States, 124 the Supreme Court discussed
the strict limitations of the abstention doctrine:
Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the
exception, not the rule. "The doctrine of abstention, under
which a District Court may decline to exercise or postpone the
exercise of its jurisdiction, is an extraordinary and narrow
exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a
controversy properly before it .. "125
Requiring mandatory abstention 12 6 whenever a tribal court has
concurrent jurisdiction runs counter to the "unflagging obligation of
the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them."1 27
The United States Supreme Court has not required mandatory
exhaustion in any decision addressing the authority of a tribe to regulate
the activities of non-tribal members. In Brendale v. Confederated Tribes
and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,128 the issue was the authority of
a tribe to impose a zoning ordinance over fee lands owned by nonIndians, but located within reservation boundaries. Similarly, in South
Dakota v. Bourland,129 the Court faced the issue of whether a tribe could
prohibit hunting by non-Indians on non-trust land located within the
reservation. Resolution of the merits in both Brendale and Bourland
involved interpretation of federal law. Moreover, the Court decided both
Brendale and Bourland long after Iowa Mutual. Yet the Supreme Court
did not require abstention in either case.

122. Chase Manhattan Bank, NA. v. State of Iran, 484 F. Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
123. See, e.g., Garpeg, Ltd. v. United States, 583 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
124. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
125. Id. at 813. See also, New Orleans Public Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S.
350, 368 (1989) ("Only exceptional circumstances justify a federal court's refusal to decide a case in
deference to the States.").
126. "Exhaustion" and "abstention" are used interchangeably by courts, although they are
distinguishable. "Exhaustion" is a procedural rule requiring litigants to "exhaust" administrative or
state remedies before seeking redress in federal courts. The purpose is to avoid premature
interruption of the administrative process. See McKart v. United States, 395 lS. 185 (1969).
"Abstention" is a procedural rule permitting federal courts to exercise discretion and relinquish
jurisdiction to avoid needless conflicts with the administration of state court affairs. See Railroad
Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
127. ColoradoRiver, 424 U.S. at 817.
128. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
129. 113 S.Ct.2309 (1993).
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Questions of concurrent jurisdiction between federal and tribal
courts should be resolved by reference to the Restatement factors. Such
factors give credence to the federal policy of encouraging tribal
self-government.
They are less deprecating than the mandatory
exhaustion rule. That rule assumes that tribal courts are somehow
inferior or weaker and require greater protection.130 The Restatement
factors give proper respect to tribal courts as independent sovereign
courts.
The Restatement factors also properly take into consideration those
cases in which resolution of the dispute principally involves a federal
question. Mandatory abstention in cases involving the interpretation of
federal law going to the merits of a controversy is not appropriate in
light of the Supreme Court's statement in Iowa Mutual that, after
abstention in favor of a tribal court, federal courts may not reconsider
the merits. This, in effect, makes tribal courts the final arbiter of federal
law in every case having an Indian reservation nexus. 13 1 This result
would run counter to the pronouncement in FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock
Tribes,132 that federal courts are not bound by legal conclusions of tribal
court and federal courts are the proper forums for resolving federal
33

law.1

IV. APPLICATION OF THE EXHAUSTION RULE TO
NATURAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT: A CASE
FOR THE RESTATEMENT RULES
Natural resources development within Indian country,1 34 particularly mineral extraction operations, provides a unique and reasonably
130. The mandatory exhaustion rule can be roughly analogized to affirmative action for tribal
courts.
131. Similarly, federal courts should not be the final arbiter of tribal laws.
132. 905 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,499 U.S. 943 (1991).
133. FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311, 1313-14 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499
U.S. 943 (1991).
134. "Indian Country" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1983), as:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the
United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including
rights-of-way running through the reservation,
(b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States
whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether
within or without the limits of a state, and
(c) all Indian allotments, the Indian title to which have not been extinguished,
including rights-of-way running through the same.
Id.
"Indian country" applies equally to criminal and civil jurisdiction. See, e.g. California v. Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 n.7 (1987); DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S.
425,427 n.2 (1975).
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controlled legal environment in which to test the incongruity of a
mandatory application of National Farmers and the appropriateness of
the Restatement hypotheses advanced in Part III.
The Rocky Mountain and Mid-Continent regions35 contain the
most geographically expansive Indian reservations in the United
States,1 36 as well as the majority of reservations of energy resource
tribes.137 Typically, the exhaustion doctrine is addressed in one of three
contexts. First, mineral extraction may occur on reservation lands which
are subject to split-estate ownership. 13 8 Second, mineral extraction may
135. The states most likely to be affected by the clash of jurisdictions are the public land states of
Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming. Reservations within Oregon and Washington are not
affected by mineral extraction operations. Reservations in Michigan and Wisconsin have not been
surveyed.
136. Acreage embraced within the exterior boundaries of reservations within the 13 Rocky
Mountain and Mid-Continent states surveyed equals 49,572,374 acres. See MAXFIELD Er AL., NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW ON AMmucAN INDtAN LANDS App. C, at 321-35 (1977). Recent decisions of the federal
judiciary have expanded the acreage total to exceed 52,000,000 acres. See, e.g., Ute Indian Tribe v.
Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072 (D. Utah 1981), affd, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S.
1002 (1986) (expanding the Uintah and Ouray Reservation by 3,000,000 acres); Hagen v. Utah, 114 S.
Ct. 958 (1994), reh'g denied, 114 S. Ct. 1580 (1994) (diminishing the expanded Uintah and Ouray
Reservation by approximately 1,000,000 acres).
137. There are currently 57 tribes registered as members of the Council of Energy Resource
Tribes.
Reservations within the Rocky Mountain and Mid-Continent regions (and tribes if different from
reservation names) include the following: ARIZONA-Big Sandy, Camp Verde, Cocopha, Colorado
River, Havasupai, Hualapal, Yavapai, Hopi, Navajo, Pagago, Fort McDowell (Pima), Gila River
(Pima), Maricopa [Ak Chin] (Pima), Salt River (Pima), San Carlos (Apache), and Kaibab;
COLORADo-Southern Ute, Ute Mountain Ute; IDArHo-Fort Hall (Shoshone-Bannock), Coeur D'Alene
(Coeur d'Alene, Kootenai, Pend d'Oreille, and Spokane), Kalispel, Kootenai, and Lapwai (Nez Perce);
KANSAS-Iowa, Kickapoo, Potawatomi, and Sac and Fox; MINNESOTA-Chippewa (Fund du Lac,
Grand Portage, Leech Lake, Mille Lac, Nett Lake, and White Earth), Granite Falls (Upper Sioux),
Morton (Lower Sioux), Prairie Island, Prior Lake, and Red Lake; MONTANA-Blackfeet (Blackfeet,
Blood, and Piegan), Crow, Flathead (Flathead, Kootenai, Kalispel, Pend d'Oreille, Bitter Root, and
Carlos Band), Fort Belknap (Assiniboine and Gros Ventre), Rocky Boy's (Chippewa Cree), Fort Peck
(Assiniboine-Sioux), Tongue River (Northern Cheyenne); NEBRASKA-Omaha, Ponca, Sundae-Sioux,
Winnebago; NEW Maxico-Jicarilla (Apache), Mescalero (Apache), United Pueblo Agency (Acoma,
Cochiti, Isleta, Jemez, Laguna, Nambe, Picunis, Pojoaque, Ramah, Sandia, San Felipe, San Ildefonso,
San Juan, Santa Ana, Santa Clara, Santa Domingo, Taos, Teseque, Zia, Zuni, Alamo [Navajo],
Canoncito [Navajo], and Ramah [Navajo]; NORTH DAKOTA-Fort Berthold (Arikara, Hidatsa, and
Mandan-The Three Affiliated Tribes), Fort Totten (Sioux), Standing Rock (Sioux), Turtle Mountain
(Chippewa); OKLAHOMA-Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek, Seminole, Quapaw, Shawnee,
Miami, Ottawa, Peoria, Quapaw, Seneca-Cayuga, Wyandotte, United Keetoowah Band Cherokees,
Alabama Quassarte (Creek), Kialegee (Creek), Kialegee (Creek), Thlopthlocco (Creek), Osage, Fort
Sill Apache, Caddo, Cheyenne, Arapaho, Iowa, Kaw, Kickapoo, Kiowa-Comanche, Otoe and
Missouri, Pawnee, Ponca, Sac and Fox, Shawnee (Absentee), Tonkawa, and Wichita Affiliated Band;
SOUTH DAKOTA-Cheyenne River (Sioux), Crow Creek (Sioux), Flandreau-Sundae Sioux, Lower Brule
Sioux, Pine Ridge (Ogalala Sioux), Rosebud (Sioux), Yankton (Sioux), Sisseton-Wahpeton (Sioux),
Standing Rock (Sioux); UTAH-Navajo, Uintah and Ouray (Northern Ute); and WYOMING-Wind
River (Shoshone-Arapaho). See MAXFIELD ET AL., supra note 136, Apps. B & D at 306-20, 337-59.
138. In the typical split-estate, the dominant mineral estate is owned by the United States, and the
subservient surface estate is owned by the tribe. On some reservations, such as the Navajo and the
Uintah and Ouray in Utah, federal, Indian, and state agencies assert operational jurisdiction over oil
and gas exploration, development, and production. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 85-868, 72 Stat. 1686 (1958)
& Pub. Land Order 3397, 29 Fed. Reg. 6685-86 (1964) (creating the 51,606.78-acre McCracken Mesa
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be conducted wholly on reservation lands, but under the auspices of
federal Indian mineral extractions statutes. 139 Third, mineral extraction
may be prosecuted on enclaves of federal, state, or private oil, gas,
uranium, and coal lands owned by non-Indians, but located within the
exterior boundaries of reservations. Operations on split-estate lands and
those conducted under the various Indian mineral leasing acts raise
federal questions distinct from the relatively narrow federal question
addressed in National Farmers regarding the scope of the tribe's
jurisdiction that should, if one is to be theoretically consistent, take cases
out of the exhaustion doctrine. Operations on federal, state, and private
inholdings within the exterior boundaries of reservations posit the
perfect application of the Restatement factors.
A.

SPLIT-ESTATES: TRIBAL SURFACE-FEDERAL OR STATE MINERALS

Boyd & McWilliams Energy Group, Inc. v. Tso140 typifies the
split-estate scenario. The case arose on the McCracken Mesa area of the
Navajo Indian Reservation in southeastern Utah. Boyd & McWilliams
obtained a permit from the United States Department of the Interior,
Bureau of Land Management (BLM),141 to drill an oil and gas well on a
federal public domain lease.14 2 The lands covered by the lease, indeed

enclave of federal (public domain) mineral estate underlying tribal surface estate within the expanded
Navajo Nation, which federal mineral estate is administered by the Bureau of Land Management
under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, and which tribal surface estate is administered by the Bureau
of Indian Affairs and the Navajo Nation); The Act of March 11, 1848, Pub. L. No. 80-440, 62 Stat. 72,
77-78 (1948) (creating the Hill Creek Extension of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation, establishing a
726,000-acre enclave of federal (public domain) mineral estate overlain by tribal surface estate). See
also FRED A. CONETAH, A HiSTORY OF THE NORTHERN UTE PEOPLE 140-142 (Kathryn L. MacKay &
Floyd A. O'Neil eds., 1982); Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072 (D. Utah 1981), affd,
773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1002 (1986) (restoring the original boundaries
of the Uintah Valley and Uncompahgre Reservations (now the Uintah and Ouray Reservation)
containing numerous inholdings of private, state, and federal lands, particularly within the
Uncompahgre portion of the reservation not affected by Hagen v. Utah, 114 S. Ct. 958, rehg denied,
114 S. Ct. 1580 (1994).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 114-25.
140. No. 93-C-1083A (D. Utah, filed Dec. 17, 1993).
141. Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Dept. of Interior, Application for Permit to Drill or
Deepen, Form 3160-December 1990, dated July 20, 1993, approved Sept. 15, 1993. The permit
authorized the drilling of the Turquoise Horse #1 Well in the NE quarter of Section 8, Township 39
South, Range 24 East, S.L.M., in San Juan County, Utah.
142. The mineral estate was covered by United States Oil and Gas Lease UTU-65994. See
Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Dept. of Interior, Offer to Lease and Lease for Oil and Gas,
UTU-65994, Form 3120, dated effective Oct. 1, 1989. The BLM issued the lease pursuant to the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 for a primary term of five years. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1986 &
Supp. 1994).
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the entire surrounding area, involved split-estate ownership.14 3 The
United States owned the dominant mineral estate as part of the public
domain. The United States held title to the subservient surface estate in
trust for the Navajo Nation. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
supervised the surface estate for the trustee, acting through its Shiprock
Agency. The BLM managed the mineral estate on behalf of the United
States. The lands covered by the lease and several adjoining leases had
been combined to form a federal oil and gas exploration unit. 14 4
The statute authorizing the exchange of Navajo Nation lands taken
for the Glen Canyon Dam project with the McCracken Mesa area
expressly directed the Secretary to reserve the minerals and to authorize
mineral activities on the reserved mineral estate subject to such
regulations as the Secretary might prescribe, including rules to protect
the tribal surface estate. 145 The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 empowers
the Secretary to promulgate regulations for the development of the
mineral estate in public domain lands. 14 6 The rules governing use of
split-estate lands involving Indian and private surface estates and federal
minerals are contained in federal Onshore Oil and Gas Order No. 1.147
Also, pursuant to federal regulations, the BLM had operational
jurisdiction over all oil and gas wells drilled on public domain and
Indian tribal and allotted lands. 14 8
The BLM approved the permit to drill only after it had obtained
concurrence of the BIA. As part of the surface approval process, Boyd &
McWilliams had been required to obtain permission of the local Aneth
Chapter of the Navajo Nation, conduct the required archeological and
other surface inspections and inventories to the satisfaction of the
Shiprock Agency, and pay the requested surface damage cash bond to

143. The split estate nature of the ownership of the lands derived from the Act of September 2,
1958, Pub. L. No. 85-868, 72 Stat. 1686 (1958) and Public Land Order No. 3397 (May 18, 1964),
under which the United States exchanged lands along the Colorado River then part of the Navajo
Indian Reservation for lands in the McCracken Mesa area of southeastern Utah. The exchange was
part of the Glen Canyon unit of the Colorado River storage project (Exchange Act). See Fed. Reg.
6685 (May 22, 1964). The PLO expressly excepted the mineral estate in the McCracken Mesa Area
as part of the land exchange. See id. at 6685. Lands within the McCracken Mesa exchange totalled
approximately 51,606.78 acres. See id. at 6686.
144. The BLM approved the commitment of the lease and adjoining leases to the Turquoise
Horse Unit effective Nov. 22, 1993. Boyd & McWilliams was both the operator of the well and the
unit. See Transcript at 54-55 (tribal court case) (testimony of Harold J. McWilliams in hearing on
motion for preliminary injunction).
145. 72 Stat. 1686 § 1 (1958). Congress acknowledged that the McCracken Mesa are was
known for its oil and gas potential. See H.R. Rep. No. 2457, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), reprinted in
1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5085,5088-89.
146. 30 U.S.C. § 189 (1986).
147. See infra text accompanying notes 168, 178.
148. 43 C.F.R. §§ 3160.0-1,3161.1 (1994).
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the Aneth Chapter.149 Concurrently, Boyd & McWilliams applied to the
Resources Committee of the Navajo Nation for a right-of-way for
surface access and use. 150
When Boyd & McWilliams commenced site preparation for the
drilling rig, members of the Aneth Chapter ordered Boyd & McWilliams'
drill-site construction personnel off the land. Tribal members formed a
human chain to prevent the contractors from working, and erected a
barbed-wire fence across the access road to prevent them from removing
their heavy equipment. Under its agreements with the lessees, Boyd &
McWilliams was obligated to commence actual drilling operations within
a very short specified period or lose its right to drill the well, its rights to
drill additional wells on the lease, its investment in obtaining permits, the
availability of the drilling rig, and its investors in the drilling program to
be conducted on the lease.151
Boyd & McWilliams sued for injunctive relief in the United States
District Court for the District of Utah. The court issued its order
enjoining individual members of the tribe and the Aneth Chapter from
interfering with drilling operations.1 5 2 The federal court rejected the
mandatory application of the exhaustion doctrine on grounds that a
federal court need not abstain when the case raised a federal question or
when the matter was not pending in tribal court. 15 3

149. See Bureau of Indian Affairs, U.S. Dept. of Interior, Transmittal of Application for Permit
to Drill/Sundry Notice, dated Aug. 6, 1993, approved by the Shiprock Agency Aug. 11. 1993
(authorizing the drilling of the Turquoise Horse #1 Well). In fact, the BLM did not issue the permit
until it had received approval from the Shiprock Agency Realty Office of the BIA. The BIA
approved the permit on August 11, 1993, following the requisite on-sight inspections and
environmental and archeological reviews and subject to inclusion of required BIA surface stipulations
which the BLM attached to the permit.
150. Transcript at 54-55 (tribal court case) (testimony of Harold J. McWilliams in hearing on
motion for preliminary injunction).
151. Boyd & McWilliams' interest stems from farmout agreements with the lessees. See
Plaintiffs Ex. 1, in Boyd & McWilliams Energy, Inc. v. Tso, No. 93-C-1083A (D. Utah, Dec. 15,
1993).
152. Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary Injunction in Boyd & McWilliams
Energy, Inc. v. Tso, No. 93-C-1083A (Dec. 17, 1993). The authors represented Boyd & McWilliams
in the United States District Court for the District of Utah.
153. When the federal marshall could not find the named parties and the tribal police refused to
serve the order, Boyd & McWilliams sought relief in Navajo Tribal Court in Shiprock, New Mexico,
praying for domestication of the federal injunction, or, in the alternative, a separate injunction from
the tribal court. See Boyd & McWilliams Energy, Inc. v. Tso, No. SR-CV-121-93 (Navajo D. Ct.,
Dec. 17, 1993).
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1. Analysis of Federal Questions Raised in Boyd &
McWilliams for Split-Estate Lands
Actions by mineral lessees to enjoin surface owners from interfering
with surface use state a cause of action under 28 U.S.C. section 1331.154
When federal questions arise beyond the limited exception of determination of the scope of tribal authority to hear cases, federal courts need not
automatically abstain from jurisdiction or require exhaustion of tribal
court remedies. 155
Boyd & McWilliams raised several federal questions. First, did the
reservation of mineral rights under the Exchange Act creating the
McCracken Mesa area carry with it the right to use the surface estate to
develop the minerals? Second, assuming that the reservation of the
mineral estate carried with it the right to use the surface, what was the
nature and scope of that right? Third, since the permit was issued
pursuant to the federal Mineral Leasing Act of 1920,156 what rights to
surface use did Boyd & McWilliams have by virtue of the lease? Fourth,
did the federal government recognize the general common law of the
dominance of the mineral estate in split-estate situations, implying a
right-of-way or way-of-necessity over and through the surface estate to
the subterranean minerals deposits? Fifth, did the federal government's
policy of self-determination for Indian tribes supersede and abrogate
rights under federal law to use so much of the surface estate as
reasonably necessary to enjoy the mineral estate? Stated another way, in
a split-estate situation, was Boyd & McWilliams subject to the jurisdiction
of the Navajo Nation Resource Committee's approval of a right-of-way
under the federal Indian Right-of-Way Act which requires consent of the
Indian tribe?
"Split-estate" lands are defined by the Solicitor of the Department
of the Interior as "those [lands] where the surface estate is owned by one
entity and the mineral estate is owned by another." 157 In that memorandum the Solicitor addressed the rights of the operator under a mineral
lease from the United States to use the surface estates patented to private
parties under the Stockraising Homestead Act of 1914 (SRHA), and
other acts. The Solicitor concluded that the operator has a right to use
154. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Smith, 471 F.2d 594, 596 (10th Cir. 1973).
155. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 813. See also South Dakota v.
Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309 (1993); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
156. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1986 & Supp. 1994).
157. See Memorandum of the Solicitor, United States Dep't. of Interior, to the Director, Bureau
of Land Management dated April 1, 1988, n.l, at 1.
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the surface estate inherent in the mineral reservations, subject only to the
BLM ensuring that the National Environmental Policy Act, the
Endangered Species Act, the National Historic Preservation Act, and
related archeological preservation act requirements are met. 158
The Solicitor's Memorandum restated the law laid down by the
United States Supreme Court in the leading case on this subject. In
Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, 159 the lessee under an oil and gas lease
from the United States sought to enforce its rights of surface access
inherent in its lease of the mineral estate. The United States owned the
mineral estate as part of the public domain. The surface had been
patented to private persons pursuant to the terms of the SRHA. The
Court ruled that when the surface and mineral estates are severed, a
servitude is laid upon the surface estate for the benefit of the mineral
owner. 160 It defined that servitude as a right appurtenant to the primary
right of exploring for and extracting the oil and gas. The appurtenant
right in the surface estate is to use the surface so far as may be necessary
to extract the oil and gas.16 1 The Court also held that the surface owners
were not entitled to compensation for the reasonable surface use.
Modem courts have embraced the rule announced in Kinney as the
doctrine of accommodation. The doctrine holds that the owner of the
dominant mineral estate may use so much of the surface estate as
reasonably necessary to explore for and extract the minerals. 16 2 The
right of the mineral owner to use the surface historically has been
referred to as an incidental estate in land and as profit A prendre,
easement, servitude, license, or right of re-entry. In the context of
federally reserved minerals, the rule has been succinctly reemphasized in
Barrett S. Duff,163 wherein the patented surface was held to be subservient to the dominant reserved federal mineral estate and the right of its
lessee to prospect for and remove the minerals. 164
One might attempt to distinguish Kinney from Boyd & McWilliams
by stating that the SRHA and the patents issued thereunder contained
express reservations of the mineral estates and rights of ingress and
egress, whereas in Boyd & McWilliams the Secretary of the Interior
(Secretary) appears to have made no such provision for ingress and
egress when he exchanged the Glen Canyon Dam properties for the
158. Id. at 8.
159. 277 U.S. 488 (1928).
160. Id.at 504.
161. Id.
162. See Slaatan v. Cliffs Drilling Co., 748 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1984); Flying Diamond Corp. v.
Rust, 551 P.2d 509 (Utah 1976); Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971).
163. Barret S. Duff, 122 IBLA 244 (1992).
164. Id. at 249.
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McCracken Mesa. That argument should fail under well established
principles of law that the mineral estate is the dominant estate in
split-estate situations even in the absence of express reservations, and a
servitude is laid upon the surface estate by severance of the two
estates. 165 Indeed, the argument made in Kinney was that by expressly
providing for the reservation and surface access in the SRHA and in the
patents issued under that act, Congress merely restated the law.
As a matter of current congressional policy, the BLM's organic
actl 66 expressly directs the Secretary to reserve the mineral estates in
conveyances of public domain lands, together with the right to
"prospect for, mine, and remove the minerals."1 67 In other words,
Congress has now succinctly made statutory what for years has been the
accepted federal common law, the law applicable to the land exchange
affecting the McCracken Mesa area.
Although there are no judicial decisions directly on point in the
context of Indian surface and BLM minerals, the SRHA cases are
instructive, if not authoritative. In fact, the Secretary has determined that
the procedures for preserving the surface estates in SRHA surface and
BLM minerals situations apply equally to Indian surface and BLM
minerals.168 Inasmuch as the Secretary considers procedures for Indian
surface estates to be identical to those for SRHA patents, it follows that
the judicial decisions construing rights of access to the surface estate to
be authority for disputes involving rights of access to Indian surface. In
summary, consent of the Indian tribe is not required in split-estate
situations, assuming that the BLM has complied with environmental,
cultural, and historic preservation acts.
Indian tribes frequently cite the Indian Right-of-Way Act of 1948
as authority for the proposition that certain tribes must consent to the
Secretary granting surface access to Indian lands. The Act requires the
Secretary to obtain tribal consent as an apparent condition precedent to
approving the right-of-way. 16 9 Since the Navajo Nation is one of the
tribes from whom consent must be obtained,1 70 it follows, the Navajo
Nation would argue, that the Secretary may not authorize surface access
without tribal consent.
165. See Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 25 A. 597, 598-99 (1893); Lovelace v.
Southwestern Petroleum Co., 267 F. 513, 517-19 (6th Cir. 1920).
166. Federal Land Policy and Management Act, Pub. L. No. 94-579. 90 Stat. 2757 (1976)
(codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1983 & Supp. 1994)).
167. 43 U.S.C. § 1719 (1983 & Supp. 1994).
168. See Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Dept. of Interior, Onshore Oil and Gas Order No. 1,
48 Fed. Reg. 48,915, 48,927, § VIIA (1983).
169. See 25 U.S.C. § 324 (1988).
170. See id.
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Reliance on the Indian Right-of-Way Act of 1948 is misplaced in
split-estate situations involving tribal surface and BLM minerals. The
Right-of-Way Act contemplates that the party seeking access has no
inherent right to use the surface. It should be noted that the Rightof-Way Act provides expressly for right-of-way for railroads, highways
and other public roads, and pipelines. The general provisions upon
which most tribes rely do not specify a type of use, but appear to serve as
general catch-alls for rights-of-way not previously identified. In these
situations, a right-of-way or license is required to empower the operator
to use the surface estate. It was never intended to supplant or even to
augment the inherent right of a mineral owner or his lessee to use the
surface by virtue of the severance of the surface and mineral estates.
Indeed, it has been suggested that the catch-all provision of section 324
was intended by Congress to apply to irrigation systems.171
Onshore Oil and Gas Order No. 1 (Onshore Order)172 constitutes
the federal rulemaking governing split-estate situations involving Indian
surface and federal minerals. The Onshore Order implements the
operational directives of the Secretary.173 According to the Onshore
Order, the operator is required to reach an agreement with the BIA
regarding protection of surface resources and reclamation. In the
absence of consent (of the BIA, not the tribe), the Secretary may approve
a permit to drill if the operator has complied with the regulations
contained in 43 C.F.R. subpart 3814 pertaining to the SRHA.174 The
regulations prohibit the operator from injuring, damaging, or destroying
permanent improvements of the surface owner.175 Further, they require
the operator to either (1) obtain an agreement for surface use from the
surface owner and (2) pay damages to crops or other tangible improvements or (3) in lieu of a consent or paying for (actual) damages, post a
bond or undertaking to the United States for the use and benefit of the

171. See cross-references and annotations following 25 U.S.C.A. § 324 (West 1983).
172. See 48 Fed. Reg. 48,916,49,927, § VIIA (1983).
173. 43 C.F.R. Subpart 3164 (1994).
174. 43 C.F.R. § 3814 (1994) addresses actions required by an operator under a mineral lease
when the surface has been patented to private owners under the Stockraising Homestead Acts. In this
instance, the Order requires operators to adhere to the same procedures for obtaining a permit on
Stockraising Homestead lands in the absence of consent when seeking access to or over surface
estates owned by individual Indians or Indian tribes.
In Boyd & McWilliams the operator reached an agreement with the BIA. Even if Boyd &
McWilliams would have been construed not to have reached an agreement with the BIA, it complied
with the procedures for obtaining a permit set forth in 43 C.F.R. Subpart 3814, as it has both posted a
drilling bond with the BLM and paid a damage deposit to the Aneth Chapter. The payment of the
surface damage deposit was intended as an accommodation to prevent the very problem that arose.
175. 43 C.F.R. § 3814.1 (c) (1994).
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surface owner. 17 6 The Secretary has.expressly stated that the drilling
77
bond alone suffices as surety.'
Noteworthy is the fact that the Onshore Order and the SRHA
regulations speak in terms of the lessee's right to "re-enter" the surface
estate. Also noteworthy is the absence from the Onshore Order of any
requirement that independent rights of surface access must be negotiated
and compensated. It follows that damages are to be paid only when
there is actual injury, damage, or destruction to crops and permanent
improvements.178 Thus, if there is no damage or destruction, the damage
deposit made to the BIA should be refunded.
How is the Onshore Order to be reconciled with the requirement of
the Indian Right-of-Way Act of 1948, if, indeed, reconciliation is
necessary? The Right-of-Way Act is intended to apply to those
situations when the operator has no right of access under a lease by
virtue of mineral reservations in a patent or other implied easements or
ways of necessity. In other words, the Act applies exclusively to those
situations when the operator must cross other Indian lands to gain access
to the leasehold lands. The Onshore Order, on the other hand, applies to
surface access on the leasehold lands themselves, when the surface is
owned by a party other than the United States. This construction is the
only logical way to harmonize the Act, the Onshore Order, judicial
decisions, and the actions of the BLM and BIA.
2. Application of the Restatement Factors is Appropriate
in a Boyd & McWilliams Split-Estate Context
The Restatement factors' 7 9 compel rejection of the mandatory
exhaustion doctrine in split-estate cases. The Secretary reserved the
mineral estate as part of the public domain in contemplation of
exploitation of the constituent minerals. There would be no other reason
for reserving minerals in public domain lands. Mineral extraction on
public domain lands are controlled by the federal Mineral Leasing Act
of 1920. Federal lessees are directly linked to the United States (public
domain), as they are operating on federal public domain lands. The

176. Id. § 3814.1(d).
177. See BLM MANUAL H-3104-1-Bonds, Section XVII.A (Rel. 3-129).
178. See Kinney-Coastal Oil, Inc. v. Kieffer, 277 U.S. at 507. It is important to note that the
compensation specified in the Onshore Order is not for the right to use the surface. Rather, it is for
damages to "crops and other tangible improvements" and is payable only if such damages occur. This
is consistent with the ruling in Kinney that compensation is due, again, not for surface access, but
exclusively for damages to crops and improvements. Id. Technically speaking, there should be no
payments if there is no injury to crops and tangible improvements.
179. See supra text accompanying note 89.
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United States has a direct interest in regulating the extraction of minerals
from public lands and the flow of royalties into the federal treasury.
The public has a justifiable expectation of enjoying royalties from
production of public domain minerals. The Indian tribe has no interest
in the mineral estate and, therefore, has no right to regulate the activity.
Provision exists in federal law and regulations for mitigating possible
conflicts occasioned by the clash of mineral rights of the United States
and surface rights of the Indian tribe. Application of federal law
provides for the weighing of the rights of both the surface and mineral
owner, while the application of tribal law may not. The court best
positioned to address the laws and consider the rights of the parties is the
federal court which (1) has a direct interest in the orderly development
of federal law and (2) is accustomed to applying the concepts of
Anglo-American jurisprudence embodied in the applicable statutes.180
B.

FEDERAL INDIAN MINERAL DEVELOPMENT STATUTES

The second scenario arises when both surface and mineral estates
are owned by Indian tribes or allottees under the trust relationship with
the United States. Mineral extraction operations are conducted under
one of three Indian mineral acts.
The Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938181 comprises, with limited
exceptions not relevant here, the comprehensive authority governing the
leasing of minerals on tribal lands. The Act states the duration of the
leases, requires consent of the tribal council or authorized spokesman,
prescribes the public auction nature of awarding leases, and establishes
bonding requirements. One of the primary purposes of the Act was to
repeal the piece-meal, often inconsistent leasing acts affecting various
Indian tribes in favor of a more universal and consistent administration
of tribal lands leasing.
The Allotted Lands Leasing Act of 1909182 provides general
authorization for leasing lands allotted in severalty to enrolled tribal
members under the various Indian allotment acts. The Secretary is
authorized to lease the lands of the allottees or their heirs at public
180. Both the exhaustion and the Restatement analyses apply equally to split-estates involving
tribal or allotted surface and state-owned minerals. Such a circumstance is exemplified by the Hill
Creek Extension to the Uintah and Ouray Reservation in eastern Utah. The United States holds title to
the surface estate for Ute Indian Tribe or its allottees and the state of Utah owns the mineral estate in
school sections 2, 16, 32, and 36 or in lands granted in lieu of the school sections. See 62 Stat. 72. See
also, Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Dept. of Interior, Areas of Responsibility and Land Status Map
for the State of Utah (ed. 1977). See generally Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072 (D. Utah
1981) (discussing state of Utah mineral inholdings underlying the Hill Creek Extension).
181. 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g (1983).
182. Id. § 396.
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auction.18 3 Consent of the tribal council or of its authorized spokesman
is not required.
The Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982184 provides for
alternative mineral extraction arrangements (other than leasing) between
the extraction industries and Indian tribes. Prior to 1982, any attempts
to develop Indian minerals other than through leasing were questionable,
if not void.185 The Act empowers Indian tribes to enter into agreements
with mineral exploration companies.
Acknowledged contractual
arrangements include joint ventures between the tribe and the operators,
operating agreements, production sharing, service sharing, leasing, and
other agreements for the exploration, extraction, gathering, and
processing of mineral.186 Allotted lands may be made part of a mineral
development agreement if tribal lands are the primary subject of the
agreement.187 All mineral development agreements must be approved
by the Secretary.1 88
The operational phases of mineral development on Indian lands are
governed by federal regulations. The BLM has overall authority and
jurisdiction of operations on Indian lands.189 Moreover, the Minerals
Management Service has collection and accounting jurisdiction over the
payment of royalties from Indian leases and agreements.190
Under the authority of the Tenth Circuit decisions, the controlling
factor in application of the exhaustion doctrine is whether the activity
giving rise to the controversy arose on Indian reservations.1 9 1 But is that
approach reasonable when operations are controlled by federal statutes?
As long as reservations are subject to the trust relationship, who has more
direct interest in ensuring the orderly development of federal Indian law
than the federal courts? Who is the best able to construe federal law?
Again, the Restatement factors,1 92 for the reasons stated above, lead to the
conclusion that federal district courts should take jurisdiction, particularly in light of the Iowa Mutual dictum that federal courts will not rehear
substantive law decided by tribal courts. 19 3

183. 25 C.F.R. § 212.4(a) (1994).
184. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101-08 (1988).
185. Louis R. MOORE & MICHAEL E. WEBSTER, 2 LAW OF FEDERAL OiL & GAS LEASES ch. XXVI, §
26.14 (1992).
186. Id. § 26.14, at 26-58.
187. 25 U.S.C. § 2102(b) (1988).
188. Id. § 2103.
189. 43 C.F.R. § 3161.1 (1994).
190. 30 C.F.R. pt. 202 (1994).
191. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Zah, 5 F.3d 1374, 1378 (10th Cir. 1993) (remanding the case for a
determination if the case arose off-reservation).
192. See supra text accompanying note 89.
193. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 16.
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Similarly, the Restatement analysis suggests that federal courts
should take jurisdiction in Indian mineral development cases. The
Secretary is charged by Congress to ensure that the trust is adequately
protected and properly managed. Mineral extraction operations on
tribal and allotted lands are controlled by the federal Indian mineral
development statutes. Federal Indian lessees are directly linked to the
United States trust relationship, as they are operating on lands subject to
the trust. As trustee, the United States has a direct interest in regulating
the extraction of minerals and flow of royalties through the federal
treasury to and for the benefit of Indian tribes and allottees. No
provision exists in tribal law and regulations for the leasing of minerals
and collection of royalties. Application of federal law provides for the
weighing of the rights of both the tribe and allottees and the lessees
approved by the BIA. Again, the court best positioned to address the
laws and consider the rights of the parties is the federal court which (1)
has a direct interest in the orderly development of federal law and (2) is
accustomed to applying the concepts of Anglo-American jurisprudence
embodied in the applicable statutes.
C.

FEDERAL, STATE, AND PRIVATE ENCLAVES

A more difficult question involves the application of the mandatory
exhaustion doctrine to enclaves of non-Indian lands within the exterior
boundaries of Indian reservations. To the extent that the lands are
federal or state enclaves, both the possibility of a federal question arising
and the limitations to the National Farmers/Iowa Mutual rule are greater.
However, what happens when the lands are private enclaves and the only
federal question is the scope of tribal court authority under the treaties
or congressional legislation establishing the reservation? The Restatement factors 194 provide a more reasoned approach to the problem.
The extraction operations themselves are the major link of the
activity to the state. The state oil and gas conservation commissions or
equivalent mining authorities are charged with regulating operations on
private and state lands.195 The state is obligated pursuant to federal
194. See supra text accompanying note 89.
195. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 40-6-1 to 40-6-18 (1993 & Supp. 1994). Section 40-6-1
provides:
.It is declared to be in the public interest to foster, encourage, and promote the
development, production, and utilization of natural resources of oil and gas in the state of
Utah in such a manner as will prevent waste; to authorize and to provide for the
operation and development of oil and gas properties in such a manner that a greater
ultimate recovery of oil and gas may be obtained and that the correlative rights of all
owners may be fully protected; to provide exclusive state authority over oil and gas
exploration and development as regulated under the provisions of this chapter; to
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environmental protection and other acts to ensure proper environmental
oversight.19 6 The state levies, assesses, and collects mineral production
taxes.197 Industry representatives conducting the operations are licensed
by the state to conduct business generally and are obligated to pay
income, franchise, and other taxes. 198 Since most mineral extraction
companies are non-Indian owned or controlled, they have an interest in
seeking resolution of their rights under a legal system that is inclined to
weigh
traditional Anglo-American
property
ownership
principles-principles under which the companies acquired their mineral
extraction rights in the first instance. Private mineral lessees are directly
linked to the state police powers.
On the other hand, the tribe does not .own the mineral estate. The
tribe derives no economic benefit from development of the minerals,
other than possible surface access fees when lessees are required to cross
adjacent Indian lands to gain access to the inholdings. Arguably, the
tribe may not levy taxes or otherwise regulate the activities. The only
real interest the tribe has is to ensure that the political integrity, economic
security, health, or welfare of the tribe will not be affected adversely.199
The court best positioned to address the laws and consider the rights of
the parties is either the federal court in diversity cases or the state courts
in all other cases-courts which are accustomed to applying the concepts
of Anglo-American jurisprudence embodied in the applicable statutes,
regulations, and contracts.
V.

CONCLUSION

International law provides a workable framework for concurrent
jurisdiction cases, but is not a panacea. It has limitations. The
Restatement factors do not work when extra-territorial enforcement of
judgments is needed. Extra-territorial enforcement between sovereigns
is the subject matter for treaties. Congress no longer executes treaties
with Indian tribes, it regulates them. Consequently, extra-territorial
enforcement cases should be controlled by statutes or by the comity
tenants of full faith and credit. Finally, the Restatement factors do not
encourage, authorize, and provide for voluntary agreements for cycling, recycling,
pressure maintenance, and secondary recovery operations in order that the greatest
possible economic recovery of oil and gas may be obtained within the state to the end
that the land owners, the royalty owners, the producers, and the general public may
realize and enjoy the greatest possible good from these vital natural resources.
Id. § 40-6-1.
196. See, e.g., Utah Environmental Code, UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 19 (1991 & Cum. Supp. 1994).
197. See., eg., id. §§ 59-5-102 (oil & gas), -5-202 (metals), -6-101 to -6-104 (mineral production
withholding tax) (1993 & Supp. 1994).
198. See, e.g., id. § 59-7-102 (1993 & Supp. 1994) (corporate franchise tax).
199. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,566 (1981).
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direct their own applicati6n when a case has been filed in the concurrent
forum and relief is sought in the other. Under the law of Colorado River
Water Conservation District v. United States, abstention should be used
sparingly .200
Moreover, application of international law is purely discretionary.
While courts are obliged to give full faith and credit to public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of foreign states within the federal
system, the application of the Restatement factors requires a case-by-case
evaluation. Discretionary application of any procedural rule suffers all
the disadvantages raised by proponents of mandatory application. 2 0 1 It
is subject to uncertainty because it requires a case-by-case determination.
It has the potential of additional expense to litigants to try the system. It
consumes the energies of federal courts to hear motions for abstention
and exhaustion. Yet, justice, not ease of application, is the goal.
The mineral extraction industries have a substantial interest in a fair
resolution of the exhaustion conundrum. The industries have become
increasingly subject to attempts by Indian tribes to regulate mineral
extraction operations on private and public lands within reservation
boundaries. In view of these continuing attempts, access to federal court
for injunctive and declaratory relief is imperative. The holdings in the
seminal cases prohibit consideration by a federal court of the appropriateness of tribal regulation and governance under certain circumstances
until the tribal court has ruled on the scope of tribal jurisdiction. The
Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits' holdings make the exhaustion doctrine
absolute, regardless of whether a federal question is involved or the lands
regulated are tribal, public, or private. In effect, it establishes a double
standard for access. It forecloses federal court relief in the first instance
to non-Indians, but leaves unfettered the right of Indian tribes to choose
'between the federal and tribal forums.202 This is not a proper result
between sovereigns.
Application of a mandatory exhaustion doctrine will have a chilling
effect203 on the development and production of natural resources vital to
the economy and national defense of the United States. The rising costs
of oil and gas exploration, development, and production simply will not
sustain the added expense of multi-jurisdictional regulation of the same
oil and gas operations and lands.2 0 4 It is one thing for tribal govern200. 424 U.S. at 813.
201. See Joranko, supra note 5.
202. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 22 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
203. See Altheimer v. Sioux Mfg. Corp., 983 F.2d 803, 815 (7th Cir. 1993); Alaska v. Native
Village of Venetie, 856 F.2d 1384, 1389 (9th Cir. 1988).
204. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 40-6-18 (1993) (asserting oil, gas, and mining operational
jurisdiction over private, federal, and tribal lands within the state of Utah).
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ments to choose as a matter of principle, philosophy, or agenda to
temporarily or permanently forego energy development of their own
lands and to postpone the enhancement of tribal treasuries by the
attendant revenue stream comprising mineral royalty and tribal
severance, use, and business activities tax dollars. However, it is quite
another to interfere by way of regulation and asserted jurisdiction with
private and public rights to explore for and produce oil and gas from
federal, state, and fee enclaves locked within those reservations or to risk
impairment of the nation's economy and security which surely will result
from loss of production from those enclaves. Adding layers of
governmental regulation and requiring submission to multiple sovereign
courts increases costs. At some point, companies will find the costs of
operating on or within the boundaries of Indian reservations prohibitive.
Finally, mineral extraction companies are concerned that they, in an
effort to protect their property rights on federal, state, and private
enclaves within Indian reservations, will find themselves subject to tribal
jurisprudence whose statutory and common law underpinnings,
particularly of property ownership, vary widely from the AngloAmerican jurisprudence under which the companies acquired and hold
their property rights. The problem is not one of moral or ethical
superiority of one body of laws over the other. Rather, it is the
incongruous result of rights acquired under one concept of law, with its
attendant expectations of use and enjoyment, being rendered subject to a
wholly different body of law and ownership philosophy in practical
enjoyment and exercise of those rights. Moreover, several commentators
note at least the perception, if not the fact, that some tribal courts suffer
qualitative and procedural deficiencies. 205 Again, the suggestion is not
one of intellectual capacity, but rather of training, experience, and
exposure. Many tribal judges are not formally trained in the law, while
others may have substantial experience in applying tribal common law
(oral traditions) to localized problems, but have little, if no, experience
applying more esoteric principles. 206 Federal courts, on the other hand,
have no experience applying tribal law. Although the relative competency of courts appears to have been dismissed by Iowa Mutual,207 it does
not follow that the relative incompetency of a federal court to decide a
205. See, e.g., Note, Recognition of Tribal Court Decisions in State Courts, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1397
(1985); Richard B. Collins et al., American Indian Courts and Tribal Self-Government, 63A.B.A. J. 808
(1977); Samuel J. Brakel,American Indian Tribal Court: Separate? "Yes," Equal? "Probably Not," 62
A.B.A.J. 1002 (1976).
206. The authors note that some of the most competent trial jurists before whom they have
appeared in their 34 years of combined experience have been law-trained, Native American tribal
judges.
207. 480 U.S. at 18-19 (citations omitted).
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point of tribal law or a tribal court's relative incompetency to decide a
point of federal law should not be taken into consideration as one of the
factors in the Restatement balancing test.
A bright-line rule of mandatory exhaustion is neither necessary nor
advisable. The Restatement factors properly take into consideration the
applicable jurisdictional interests of federal and tribal courts. A
mandatory exhaustion rule is demeaning to tribal courts, suggesting that
tribal courts require jurisdictional protection from the federal government. Tribal self-government is encouraged by treating tribal courts
more like independent sovereign courts. The Restatement factors are
used to resolve jurisdictional disputes between federal and independent
sovereign courts. These factors provide the most appropriate resolution
of issues involving jurisdictional disputes between federal and tribal
courts.

